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A Critique of the Establishment of a
Specialized Immigration Court
TIMOTHY S. BARKER*
Maurice Roberts' article accurately describes the current state
of the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals.
His portrayal of the system as one plagued by delays and tainted
by the lack of independence from the enforcement branch of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service reflects the common per-
ception amongst practioners before the immigration courts and
the Board. Like Mr. Roberts, such practitioners, as well as the im-
migration judges themselves, feel there is a pressing need to
change the current structure of the immigration courts and the
Board. There is disagreement, though, on what the nature of the
change should be.
The debate over the structure of the future immigration court
system involves the question of whether a specialized immigra-
tion court and appellate division should be established under arti-
cle I of the Constitution or whether the existing system should be
removed from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and established as an independent agency within the Department
of Justice. Mr. Roberts advocates the creation of an article I spe-
cialized court. I respectfully disagree and contend that independ-
ent agency status within the Department of Justice is the
optimum solution. My disagreement is basically directed toward
the elimination of judicial review by the courts of appeals which
would result if a specialized immigration court system were es-
tablished.
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December 1980 Vol. 18 No. 1
The arguments generally advanced for the creation of a special-
ized court to handle a particular area of administrative law are:
(1) it provides caseload relief for the courts of general jurisdic-
tion; (2) it creates uniformity and certainty of law by eliminating
decisions by the various district courts and circuit courts of ap-
peals; and (3) the highly technical nature of administrative deci-
sions are better understood by the specialist as opposed to the
generalist judge.1 Application of these considerations to the cur-
rent immigration court system, however, fails to offer a persuasive
argument for the creation of the new specialized court.
First, the caseload relief to the courts of appeals would be in-
consequential. In 1979 only 194 petitions for review were ified in
all the various circuits.2 This represents a continuing decline in
the number of petitions for review being filed each year.3 Second,
the problem of conflicting decisions between the courts of ap-
peals 4 is in no way unique to administrative agencies in general,
or to the immigration courts in particular. Conflicts result from
the nature of the federal judicial system and it is the function of
the Supreme Court to resolve the varying positions. Due to the
exigencies of the Supreme Court's caseload the resolution of con-
flicts is taking substantially longer than in the past. Regardless,
the nature of the conflicting decisions facing the immigration
courts is far from the crisis proportions necessary to justify the
creation of a specialized court to resolve the problem.5 Finally,
1. See Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action"
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLum. L. REV. 1, 62-68 (1975).
2. [1979] DIRECTOR AD. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS REP. A6.
3. In 1978 there were 257 petitions filed, compared to 295 in 1977 and 387 in
1976. The reason for the decline may be partly attributed to sanctions being im-
posed upon attorneys who ifie petitions for review for the purposes of delay. See,
e.g., Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1978) ($1000 fine and double costs im-
posed); Acevedo v. INS, 538 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1976) (double costs imposed); In re
Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973) (one year suspension and $500 fine).
4. The major example of this type of conflict arose between the Second and
Ninth Circuits over the availability of relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976) in de-
portation proceedings. Compare, Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976) with
Bowe v. INS, 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1979). This conflict was recently resolved with
the Ninth Circuit accepting the Francis position. Tapia-Acuna v. INS, - F.2d -
(9th Cir. 1981). Another example of this type of conflict arose concerning the eligi-
bility of children for immigration through their stepparent. The BIA required evi-
dence of "active parental interest" in the stepchild's support and general instruc-
tion. In re Moreira, LD. No. 2792 (1980). The Ninth Circuit rejected this position
and held the stepchild eligible for immigration merely on the basis of a valid mar-
riage between the parents. Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980). This con-
flict has also been resolved with the recent BIA decision to apply the Ninth
Circuit's position nationwide. In re McMillian, I.D. No. 2844 (1981).
5. It is questionable whether the Board has to follow the ruling of a court of
appeals in other cases arising within the court's jurisdiction. In Castillo-Felix v.
INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979), the court indicated that the Board was not so
bound. Similar problems have been experienced by the Tax Court. It was not un-
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the nature of the issues raised in deportation proceedings, al-
though somewhat technical in nature, is in no way beyond the in-
tellectual grasp of an appellate court judge. Unlike the issues
raised in the customs, patent, or bankruptcy areas, deportation
cases mainly involve simple factual situations, due process con-
siderations and discretionary determinations. Appellate judges
experienced in handling criminal, civil and administrative cases
from a host of different agencies are well suited to handle these
issues.
The argument for a new specialized immigration court is even
weaker when the disadvantages are considered. The specialized
court would eliminate review by the courts of appeals. In practi-
cal terms this would mean an almost total loss of review by courts
of general jurisdiction since the Supreme Court's caseload would
basically preclude review in all but the most exceptional cases.
The loss of the contribution made by the courts of appeals to the
administration and development of justice in the immigration and
deportation area would be devastating. The courts of appeals,
with their generalist perspective and diverse views gained
through extensive experience in the whole spectrum of substan-
tive and procedural areas, make a great contribution to the crea-
tive development of administrative law in general and
immigration law in particular.6 The judges of the courts of ap-
peals provide an essential counterbalance to the inevitable
prejudices and limited perspectives which develop within an
agency solely concerned with its operation in one limited area of
law. Additionally, the development of varying positions by differ-
ent circuits is beneficial to the illumination and analysis of issues
before final resolution by the Supreme Court. These dynamics
would be lost if a specialized immigration court were to be estab-
lished.
The resolution of the problems now being experienced by the
immigration courts and the Board can be solved without the crea-
til 1970 that the Tax Court decided to consider itself bound by courts of appeals
decisions. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977) (involuntary state-
ments inadmissible in deportation proceedings on fifth amendment grounds);
Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977) (failure to give attorney 72 hours notice
of execution of deportation order voids removal of alien and Service ordered to re-
admit him to the country); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (relief under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976) granted to all otherwise eligible permanent residents in de-
portation hearings on equal protection grounds).
tion of a specialized court. The problem of delay is one of eco-
nomics and the solution is merely one of affording the
immigration courts and the Board adequate resources to handle
their caseloads. In all probability the amount of funding neces-
sary for the establishment of the specialized court would far ex-
ceed the cost of upgrading the present system. The problem of
independence can be remedied by separating the immigration
courts and the Board from the INS and establishing them as an-
other agency within the Department of Justice similar to the Pa-
role Commission. The authority to control budgetary allocations
and the administration of the courts could rest with the Board.
The supervision of the immigration judges would no longer rest
within the enforcement branch of the INS. The immigration
courts and the Board would then become self-sufficient, with their
independence firmly established.
